









This	 article	 is	 the	 first	 that	 quantifies	 the	 impact	 of	 single	 windows	 (SWs)	 on	 international	 trade	 globally.	 SWs	
function	 as	 a	 single	 point	 of	 entry	 and	 exit	 of	 the	 goods	 traded	 internationally	 and	 are	 therefore	 intended	 to	
facilitate	trade.	Using	a	structural	gravity	model	for	a	panel	of	176	countries	from	1995	to	2017,	we	apply	a	log-log	
and	a	Poisson	pseudo-maximum	 likelihood	estimator	 (PPML)	will	multi-dimensional	 fixed	effects	 to	evaluate	 the	
extent	to	which	export	and	import	flows	vary	depending	on	whether	or	not	countries	have	operational	SWs.	The	





































functioning	SWs.	More	 specifically,	we	examine	 the	 impact	of	 SWs	on	 trade	by	estimating	how	much	
trade	increases	when	these	trade	facilitation	instruments	are	implemented.	With	this	aim,	we	employ	a	
two-steps	approach	(Head	and	Mayer,	2014):	In	the	first	step	a	PPML	estimator	with	multi-dimensional	
fixed	 effects	 is	 estimated,	 from	 which	 the	 country-time	 fixed	 effects	 are	 recovered,	 whereas	 in	 the	
second	step	those	are	used	as	dependent	variables	and	regressed	on	the	SW	indicator.	
The	 main	 results	 obtained	 from	 the	 estimations	 of	 the	 log-log	 gravity	 model	 estimated	 with	 multi-
dimensional	fixed	effects	show	that	total	trade	between	two	countries	with	functioning	SWs	increases	
by	about	37%,	of	which	23	corresponds	 to	exports	and	14	 to	 imports.	However,	 the	 results	are	more	
modest	when	the	PPML	estimation	of	the	gravity	model	is	considered.	






Improving	 the	 efficiency	 of	 cross-border	 trade	 is	 a	 pressing	 need	 for	 both	 developing	 and	 developed	
countries.	 Although	 there	 are	 earlier	 examples	 of	 SW-like	 mechanisms	 based	 on	 more	 rudimentary	
information	technology,	SWs	really	began	to	take	off	at	the	end	of	the	20th	century	with	the	spread	of	
the	internet.	
The	work	of	 the	United	Nations	Economic	Commission	 for	Europe	was	key	 to	 this	process:	 in	2003,	 it	
recommended	 establishing	 SWs	 to	 simplify	 border	 formalities	 by	 unifying	 paperwork	 into	 a	 single	
electronic	 record	 that	 would	 comply	 with	 regulatory	 requirements	 and	 facilitate	 the	 work	 of	 border	
agencies	and	the	business	community	(UNECE,	2003).	
UNECE	 (2003)	 defines	 SWs	 as	 an	 environment	 that	 enables	 and	 streamlines	 flows	 of	 information	
between	those	involved	in	cross-border	trade	and	government	entities,	bringing	significant	gains	to	all	
parties.	These	“one-stop	shops”	allow	agents	to	submit	all	 information	needed	for	complying	with	the	
regulatory	 requirements	 for	 importing	 or	 exporting	 through	 a	 single	 channel.	 SWs	 also	 store	
standardized	 information and documents	 and	 function	 as	 a	 single	 entry	 point,	 such	 that	 the	 specific	
information	for	complying	with	export,	import,	and	transit	requirements	only	needs	to	be	uploaded	into	
the	system	once.	
In	 general	 exporters	 or	 importers	must	 fill	 in	 the	 electronic	 forms	 in	 their	 own	 country	 for	 export	 or	
import	 using	 SWs.1	 Single	 window	 projects	 usually	 involve	 IT-based	 innovation,	 but	 also	 create	 a	
platform	 for	 effective	 collaboration	 at	 the	 border	 between	 Customs,	 Other	 Government	 Agencies	












developing	 countries	 began	 to	 pay	 heed	 to	 this	 recommendation,	 which	was	 followed	 by	 a	 series	 of	
specific	studies	to	help	countries	implement	their	own	SWs.	UN/CEFACT	(2005)	(or	Recommendation	33,	
as	it	is	commonly	known)	sets	out	a	number	of	necessary	factors	for	successful	implementation.	The	list	
of	requirements	 includes	political	will,	strong	 leadership	from	the	 lead	government	agency,	a	strategic	




solid	 legal	 regime	 which	 allows	 for	 data	 to	 be	 collected,	 accessed,	 and	 distributed	 and	 “clarifies	
confidentiality,	privacy	and	liability	regimes,	[making]	it	possible	to	create	a	solid	basis	for	the	operation	
of	the	facility,	and	build	a	relationship	of	trust	between	all	stakeholders.”	
Recommendation	 36	 concerns	 the	 interoperability	 of	 SWs	 (UN/CEFACT,	 2017),	 where	 the	 term	




The	 consensus	 around	 the	 benefits	 of	 one-stop	 shops	 or	 SWs	 has	 grown	 over	 time.	 In	 2012,	 the	
European	 Parliament	 established	 that	 one	 of	 the	 ultimate	 objectives	 of	 the	 European	 Union’s	 trade	










such	 systems	 can	 take	many	 years	 and	 should	 be	 carried	 out	 in	 several	 stages.	 It	 requires	 long-term	
commitment	from	both	the	public-	and	private-sphere	stakeholders	involved.	The	European	Commission	
(2015)	described	the	difficulties	around	getting	EU	member	countries	to	make	headway	on	this	initiative	
and	 implement	 an	 SW	 system.	 As	 mentioned,	 governments	 have	 focused	 on	 creating	 national	 SW	
systems	without	acting	in	a	coordinated	fashion	to	facilitate	the	interoperability	of	SWs.	For	example,	to	
move	 toward	 interoperability,	 it	 would	 be	 helpful	 if	 trade	 agreements	 between	 countries	 included	
detailed	clauses	for	information	exchange.	
More	recently,	WEF	(2018)	called	for	a	governance	model	for	interoperability	to	be	defined	and	for	the	
relevant	 legal	 protocols	 and	 obligations	 to	 be	 established.	 The	 report	 recommended	 that	 national	

















Figure	 2	 shows	 that	 half	 of	 the	 total	 operational	 SWs	 are	 in	 high-income	 countries	 and	 sub-Saharan	
Africa.	 High-income	 countries	 and	 those	 in	 Latin	 America	 are	 currently	 the	 most	 active	 in	 terms	 of	













The	 evolution	 of	 SWs	 in	 recent	 years	 reflects	 countries’	 growing	 interest	 in	 combining	 SWs	with	 the	
technologies	 of	 the	 Fourth	 Industrial	 Revolution,	 such	 as	 IoT	 (the	 Internet	 of	 Things),	 artificial	
intelligence,	and,	above	all,	blockchain.4	Despite	 this	growing	appeal,	 few	empirical	 studies	have	been	





(2011)	 presents	 a	 descriptive	 assessment	 for	 SWs.	 Although	 the	 references	 are	 vague	 and	 lack	 a	
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and	 logistical	 performance	 indicators	 have	 improved	 through	 SWs,	 although	 he	 does	 not	 provide	
concrete	data	to	support	this	claim.	
A	survey	of	177	countries	published	by	Choi	 (2001)	 found	that	15	agencies	on	average	are	 involved	 in	









Volpe	 Martincus	 (2017)	 analyzes	 the	 impact	 that	 Costa	 Rica’s	 SW	 has	 had	 by	 identifying	 specific	














absence	of	 an	 SW,	aggregate	exports	would	have	been	2%	 lower	on	average	 than	 they	actually	were	
between	2008	and	2013,	which	is	equal	to	approximately	0.5%	of	the	country’s	total	GDP.7	
Volpe	Martincus	 (2017)	 arrives	 at	 similar	 results	 for	 Colombia,	 where	 the	 greater	 ease	 of	 importing	
goods	from	abroad	that	has	come	with	the	SW	system	has	led	to	a	sharp	increase	in	imports,	but	argues	
that	 additional	 research	 is	 needed	 to	 establish	 how	 these	 arrangements	 work	 in	 other	 countries.	
According	 to	 Evans	 and	 Harrigan	 (2005),	 the	 effect	 of	 shorter	 delivery	 times	 is	 equivalent	 to	 an	
improvement	in	product	quality,	which	in	turn	allows	companies	to	increase	the	prices	of	their	products	
and	their	export	volumes.	
WEF	 (2018)	 points	 out	 that	 Senegal’s	 SW	 system	 has	 reduced	 time	 at	 customs	 from	 two	weeks	 to	 a	
single	day.	This	has	brought	the	cost	of	border	management	down	by	60%	and	the	customs	agency	has	
had	 to	 reassign	 staff	 to	 other	 areas.	 Other	 studies	 on	 trade	 facilitation	 take	 the	 same	 approach,	
analyzing	 the	 impact	 of	 SWs	 on	 the	 number	 of	 days	 it	 takes	 to	 export	 or	 import	 products.	 The	
methodology	 that	 we	 propose	 below	 has	 not	 yet	 been	 used	 to	 measure	 how	 SWs	 impact	 trade	
performance.	
IV.	Impact	on	Trade	
IV.1. Data, Variables, and Sources 
We	will	begin	by	describing	the	sources	of	the	data	used	in	the	estimations.	The	data	on	SWs	has	been	
compiled	 from	 information	 from	 the	 Inter-American	 Development	 Bank	 (IADB)	 and	 from	websites	 of	
ministries	of	foreign	trade	or	the	agency	responsible	for	trade	facilitation	in	each	country	in	the	sample.	










US	 dollars	 and	 the	 populations	 of	 trading	 countries	 were	 taken	 from	 the	 World	 Bank	 World	
Development	 Indicators	 (WDI).	The	advantage	of	using	country	 level	data	 to	assess	 the	 issue	of	single	
windows	 is	 that	 it	 mitigates	 some	 of	 the	 measurement	 errors	 and	 biases	 associated	 with	 firm-level	
measures	(see	Asiedu	and	Freeman,	2009),	and	all	types	of	potential	spillovers	are	implicitly	captured	at	
the	aggregated	export	measures.	
The	geographical	and	cultural	 variables	used	 to	estimate	 the	 traditional	gravity	model	are	 from	CEPII.	
These	 include	 the	 geographical	 distance	 between	 country	 pairs,	 as	 a	 variable	 representing	
transportation	 costs;	 the	 area	 of	 each	 country	 in	 square	 kilometers;	 and	 a	 series	 of	 dichotomous	
variables	 that	 take	 the	 value	of	 1	when	 countries	 share	 an	official	 language,	 share	 a	border,	 have	no	
access	to	the	sea,	or	have	colonial	ties,	and	0	otherwise.	Dichotomous	variables	were	also	included	that	
take	the	value	of	1	 if	 the	exporting	(importing)	country	 is	a	member	of	the	World	Trade	Organization,	
free	 trade	 agreements,	 or	 monetary	 unions,	 and	 0	 otherwise.	 The	 variables	 relating	 to	 free	 trade	
agreements	and	monetary	unions	have	been	updated	 from	 information	 compiled	by	De	Sousa	 (2012)	
using	the	same	sources	cited	by	the	authors.	Table	A.3	in	the	Appendix	summarizes	the	variables	used	in	
the	empirical	analysis,	 including	names,	definitions,	and	sources.	The	data	on	the	number	of	days	and	










Variable	 Obs	 Mean	 Std.	Dev.	 Min	 Max	
lexp	 387,180	 7.518	 4.078	 -6.908	 20.038	
lgdp_exp	 387,180	 24.450	 2.256	 16.395	 30.523	
lgdp_imp	 387,180	 24.450	 2.256	 16.216	 30.523	
lpop_exp	 387,180	 16.050	 1.765	 9.15599	 21.039	
lpop_imp	 387,180	 16.050	 1.765	 9.155	 21.039	
ldist	 387,180	 8.642	 0.811	 4.088	 9.899	
lang	 387,180	 0.151	 0.358	 0	 1	
border	 387,180	 0.023	 0.148	 0	 1	
comcol	 387,180	 0.094	 0.291	 0	 1	
larea_exp	 387,180	 11.894	 2.263	 3.332	 16.117	
larea_imp	 387,180	 11.894	 2.263	 3.332	 16.117	
landlocked_exp	 387,180	 0.185	 0.388	 0	 1	
landlocked_imp	 387,180	 0.185	 0.388	 0	 1	
wto	 387,180	 0.692	 0.462	 0	 1	
sw_o	 387,180	 0.105	 0.307	 0	 1	
sw_d	 387,180	 0.103	 0.304	 0	 1	
sw_od	 387,180	 0.013	 0.114	 0	 1	
Note:	The	definitions	of	the	variables	can	be	found	in	Table	A.3.	
The	 figures	 that	 follow	show	how	the	distribution	of	exports	varies	depending	on	whether	or	not	 the	
exporter	countries	have	an	operational	SW.	Figure	3	shows	the	density	 function	for	exports	 in	natural	
logarithms	for	four	cases:	when	neither	of	the	two	trading	countries	has	an	SW,	when	only	the	exporter	
or	 only	 the	 importer	 country	 has	 an	 SW,	 and	when	 both	 have	 an	 SW.	As	 can	 be	 seen,	when	 neither	
country	 has	 an	 SW	 (the	 solid	 line),	 the	 graph	 is	more	 to	 the	 left,	 while	when	 only	 the	 exporter	 (the	
dashed	line)	or	importer	(the	dotted	line)	does,	the	density	of	exports	shifts	more	to	the	right.	This	shift	
is	greater	for	the	exporter	than	for	the	importer.	When	both	countries	have	SWs	(the	dash-dotted	line),	
the	 density	 function	 is	 even	 further	 to	 the	 right	 than	 in	 the	 two	 previous	 cases.	 Consequently,	 this	
graphical	 representation	 indicates	that	the	magnitude	of	trade	flows	 is	greater	 for	countries	with	SWs	






















port	officials.	 To	make	 the	data	 comparable	 from	one	 country	 to	 the	next,	 various	 assumptions	were	
made	about	the	businesses	and	goods	that	are	traded.	The	businesses	included	had	to	be	located	in	the	





















import	 and	export	privileges.	 The	 company	must	be	entirely	nationally	owned	and	must	 export	more	
than	10%	of	its	sales.	The	product	being	traded	must	travel	in	full	load,	in	a	20-foot	container,	and	must	
be	nonhazardous	and	not	include	military	goods.	It	must	not	require	special	transportation	conditions,	
such	as	 refrigeration,	or	 special	phytosanitary	or	environmental	 safety	 standards	other	 than	accepted	
international	norms.	Finally,	the	product	must	be	included	in	the	following	Standard	International	Trade	
Classification	 (SITC)	categories:	SITC	65	 (textile	yarn	and	related	products);	SITC	84	 (articles	of	apparel	
and	clothing	accessories);	or	SITC	07	(coffee,	tea,	cocoa,	spices,	and	manufactures	thereof).	












































































IV.2. Empirical Model and Methodology 
The	 gravity	model	 has	 been	widely	 used	 to	 predict	 bilateral	 trade	 flows	 between	 countries	 in	 recent	
decades	and	is	the	go-to	model	for	international	trade	analysis	(Feenstra,	2004).	It	is	a	structural	model	
with	solid	theoretical	underpinnings	(Eaton	and	Kortum,	2002;	Anderson	and	Van	Wincoop,	2003;	Allen,	








































ln𝑋!"#$ = 𝑙𝑛 𝑌!" + 𝑙𝑛 𝑌!" − 𝑙𝑛 𝑌!! + 1 − 𝜎 𝑙𝑛 𝑡!"# − 1 − 𝜎 𝑙𝑛 𝑃!" − (1 − 𝜎)𝑙𝑛 𝑃!"		(2)	
In	model	(2),	we	assume	that	trade	costs	are	a	linear	function	of	the	distance	between	trading	countries	
and	a	series	of	factors	that	facilitate	trade	such	as	speaking	a	common	language	(Lang),	sharing	a	border	
(Border),	having	colonial	 ties	 (Comcol),	and	being	part	of	 free	 trade	agreements	 (RTA)	or	members	of	
monetary	unions	(Comcur)	or	the	WTO	(WTO).	The	linear	model	to	be	estimated	is:	
ln(𝑋!"#$) = 𝛼! + 𝛼! ln𝑌!" + 𝛼! ln𝑌!" + 𝛼!𝑙𝑛 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡!"
+ 𝛼!𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑙! + 𝛼!𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑙! + 𝛼!𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎! + 𝛼!𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎! + 𝛼! 𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟!" 	
+𝛼!𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔!"+𝛼!"𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑐𝑜𝑙!" + 𝛼!!𝑊𝑇𝑂!"# + 𝛼!"𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑐𝑢𝑟!"# + 𝛼!"𝑅𝑇𝐴!"# + 𝛼!"𝑆𝑊!" + +𝛼!"𝑆𝑊!" + 𝑢!"#	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (3)	
where,	 in	addition	to	 the	variables	described	above,	Landl	 indicates	 that	 the	country	has	no	access	 to	
the	sea,	Area	denotes	the	area	of	country	i(j)	in	square	kilometers,	and	SW	indicates	that	i	or	j	have	SWs	
in	period	t.	
The	 rapid	 ongoing	 development	 of	 new	 techniques	 for	 estimating	 the	 model,	 which	 are	 based	 on	
theoretical	 advances,	 has	 given	 rise	 to	 a	 series	 of	 practical	 recommendations	 that	 have	 been	 well	
documented	 in	Head	 and	Mayer	 (2014)	 and	more	 recently	 in	 Larch	 et	 al.	 (2016)	 and	 Piermartini	 and	














variable	 bilateral	 factors,	 such	 as	 being	 a	 member	 of	 a	 currency	 union	 (CU)	 or	 the	 World	 Trade	
Organization	 (WTO)	 or	 regional	 or	 bilateral	 trade	 agreements.	 Finally,	 εijt	 is	 the	 error	 term	 and	 is	
assumed	to	be	identically	or	independently	distributed.		
Exporter-time	(𝜏!")	and	importer-time	(𝜑!") fixed	effects	represent	all	manner	of	trade	barriers	that	are	









levels	 of	 exports,	 whereby	 zeros	 are	 included	 in	 the	 dependent	 variable	 and	 the	 method	 is	 robust	 to	




A	 similar	 model	 was	 estimated	 for	 importing	 countries	 (j)	 for	 importer-time	 fixed	 effects	 (𝜑!").	 To	
account	for	factors	such	as	institutions,	infrastructure,	or	cultural	factors	that	vary	slowly,	the	estimation	
includes	unobservable	country	effects	–fixed	or	 random–	effects.	Yit	 indicates	 the	exporter’s	GDP.	Pop	








in	Dij),	 and	measures	 of	 cultural	 similarities	 (Dij):	 how	many	 partners	 it	 shares	 a	 language,	 border,	 or	
colonial	relationship	with.	
IV.3. Main Results 
The	gravity	model	for	exports	between	176	countries12	was	estimated	with	annual	data	for	1995–2017.	
First,	Table	2	shows	the	results	obtained	for	the	traditional	gravity	model	estimated	with	the	dependent	
variable	 in	natural	 logarithms,	so	as	to	compare	this	with	the	two-stage	model,	which	 is	the	preferred	
option.	Column	(1)	 includes	the	country	variables	(income	and	area	of	the	exporting	country),	and	the	
bilateral	 variables	 (common	border,	 common	 language,	 colonial	 ties,	etc.)	 that	 tend	 to	be	 included	as	
facilitators	of	or	impediments	to	bilateral	trade,	according	to	specification	(3).	







of	 sharing	 a	 border,	 language,	 or	 colonial	 ties	 facilitate	 trade,	with	 a	 shared	 border	 playing	 the	most	
significant	role:	neighboring	countries	trade	178%	more	than	they	do	with	other	countries.	The	variable	
of	interest—that	is,	whether	or	not	the	exporter	or	importer	country	or	both	have	operational	SWs—a	
reveals	 that	 the	 exporter	 alone	 has	 an	 operational	 SW	 then	 exports	 are	 40%	 greater,	 if	 the	 importer	
alone	 has	 one,	 they	 are	 38%	 greater,	 and	 if	 both	 countries	 have	 them,	 these	 two	 increases	 are	
combined.	The	second	column	shows	the	results	that	were	obtained	after	including	fixed	effects	for	the	
exporter	 and	 the	 importer	 in	 the	model	 to	 control	 for	multilateral	 resistance	 that	does	not	 vary	over	
time.	It	can	be	observed	that	the	effect	of	SWs	in	just	one	country	is	considerably	reduced	for	both	the	
exporter	(a	one-third	drop)	and	the	 importer	(a	two-thirds	drop).	However,	when	both	countries	have	
SWs	 there	 is	a	40%	 increase	 in	exports	 (25+15).	Similar	 results	are	obtained	 in	column	 (3),	which	was	
estimated	with	fixed	bilateral	effects.	Finally,	column	(4)	shows	the	results	when	three	groups	of	fixed	




		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	
VARIABLES	 lnX_TFE	 lnX_TCFE	 lnX_BFE	 lnX_BCTFE	
		 		 		 		 		








	wto	 0.399***	 0.355***	 0.276***	 0.168***	
	 (0.026)	 (0.030)	 (0.022)	 (0.031)	
comcur	 0.352***	 0.083	 0.214***	 0.166***	
	 (0.094)	 (0.094)	 (0.035)	 (0.024)	
rta	 0.879***	 0.717***	 0.185***	 0.104***	
	 (0.036)	 (0.033)	 (0.020)	 (0.012)	











































	 	 	Time	effects	(TFE)	 yes	 yes	 yes	
	Observations	 387,180	 387,180	 387,180	 402,398	
Adjusted	R-squared	 0.671	 0.739	 0.154	 0.879	
Number	of	pairs	 		 		 27,242	 		
Note:	 Robust	 standard	 errors	 in	 parentheses.	 ***	 p<0.01,	 **	 p<0.05,	 *	 p<0.1.	 BCTFE	 denotes	 bilateral,	 exporter-time	 and	
importer	and	time	fixed	effects.	A	description	of	the	variables	is	given	in	Table	A.3.	
Table	3	shows	the	results	obtained	from	estimating	model	(5)	for	exporters	–with	random	effects	in	the	








		 (1)	Exporter	 (2)	Exporter	 (3)	Importer	 (4)	Importer	
	Dep.	Var:	MRT	
	from	first	step§	 FE1_2RE	 FE1_2FE	 FE2_2RE	 FE2_2FE	
	IND.	Var:	 		 		 		 		
	sw	 0.226***	 0.210***	 0.144***	 0.134***	
	 (0.071)	 (0.073)	 (0.051)	 (0.047)	 	
lgdp	 0.668***	 0.412***	 0.775***	 0.725***	
	
	
(0.054)	 (0.083)	 (0.036)	 (0.061)	
	lpop	 0.149*	 -0.159	 0.265***	 0.318	
	
	
(0.090)	 (0.413)	 (0.071)	 (0.237)	



























































	 	Time	effects	(TFE)	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
	Number	of	id	 26,425	 26,425	 26,326	 26,326	
	Number	of	obs	 394,452	 394,452	 393,740	 393,740	





IV.4. Robustness Checks 
As	robustness	checks	we	have	estimated	different	versions	of	the	gravity	model	using	a	PPML	estimation	
technique,	 as	 proposed	 in	 the	 related	 literature	 (Head	 and	 Mayer,	 2014;	 Larch	 et	 al,	 2016;	 among	
others).	The	first	stage	estimations	are	presented	in	the	Appendix	(Table	A5).	The	results	for	the	target	
variable	 indicate	 that	 the	coefficient	of	 the	SWs	dummies	 is	positive	and	statistically	 significant	 in	 the	
first	 column	 of	 Table	 A5,	 when	 only	 time	 fixed	 effects	 are	 considered.	 However,	 the	 introduction	 of	
exporter	 and	 importer	 fixed	 effects	 or	 pair	 fixed	 effects	 render	 the	 coefficients	 non-statistically	
significant.	In	any	case,	when	the	model	is	estimated	in	two	stages,	the	results	obtained	for	the	second	
stage,	 reported	 in	Table	4,	also	suggest	 that	SWs	stimulate	 trade.	Nevertheless,	 the	magnitude	of	 the	
effects	 is	 considerably	 lower,	 possibly	 due	 to	 the	 inclusion	 of	 zeros	 in	 the	 dependent	 variable	 in	 the	




		 (1)Exporter	 (2)Exporter	 (3)Importer	 (4)Importer	
Dep.	 Var:	 MRT	 from	
first	step	PPML	 FE1_2RE	 FE1_2FE	 FE2_2RE	 FE2_2FE	
22	
	
IND.	Var:	 		 		 		 		
sw	 0.009***	 0.009***	 0.002***	 0.002***	
	 (0.001)	 (0.001)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	
lgdp	 0.017***	 0.011***	 0.009***	 0.009***	
	
(0.001)	 (0.001)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	
lpop	 -0.002*	 -0.014***	 -0.007***	 -0.008***	
	
(0.001)	 (0.002)	 (0.001)	 (0.001)	
wto	 -0.010***	 -0.010***	 0.002***	 0.002***	
	

















































	Time	effects	(TFE)	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
Number	of	id		 27,745	 27,745	 27,184	 27,184	
Number	of	obs	 395,909	 395,909	 395,184	 395,184	
Within	R-squared	 		 0.010	 		 0.032	































































and	 the	 consequent	 increase	 in	 the	 volumes	of	 trade	 and	 in	 the	 time	 involved	 in	 this,	which	 enables	
more	operations	to	be	performed	during	the	same	period.	
The	line	of	research	that	this	study	has	opened	up	points	to	a	need	for	quantitative	estimations	of	the	
impact	 of	 SWs	 on	 export	 performance.	 Future	 studies	 that	 build	 on	 this	 one	might	 analyze	 whether	
trade	 agreements	 help	 leverage	 the	 benefits	 of	 SWs,	 whether	 SWs	 are	more	 effective	 in	 developing	
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1	 Australia	 High	income:	OECD	 High	income	
2	 Azerbaijan	 Europe	&	Central	Asia	 Upper	middle	income	
3	 Bahrain	 Middle	East	&	North	Africa	 High	income	
4	 Benin	 Sub-Saharan	Africa	 Low	income	
5	 Brazil	 Latin	America	&	Caribbean	 Upper	middle	income	
6	 Cameroon	 Sub-Saharan	Africa	 Lower	middle	income	
7	 Colombia	 Latin	America	&	Caribbean	 Upper	middle	income	
8	 Côte	d'Ivoire	 Sub-Saharan	Africa	 Lower	middle	income	
9	 Costa	Rica	 Latin	America	&	Caribbean	 Upper	middle	income	
10	 Ecuador	 Latin	America	&	Caribbean	 Upper	middle	income	
11	 Finland	 High	income:	OECD	 High	income	
12	 France	 High	income:	OECD	 High	income	
13	 Germany	 High	income:	OECD	 High	income	
14	 Ghana	 Sub-Saharan	Africa	 Lower	middle	income	
15	 Indonesia		 East	Asia	&	Pacific	 Lower	middle	income	
16	 Iran,	Islamic	Rep.	 Middle	East	&	North	Africa	 Upper	middle	income	
17	 Israel	 High	income:	OECD	 High	income	
18	 Italy	 High	income:	OECD	 High	income	
19	 Japan		 High	income:	OECD	 High	income	
20	 Kenya	 Sub-Saharan	Africa	 Low	income	
21	 Korea,	Rep.	 High	income:	OECD	 High	income	
22	 Macedonia,	FYR	 Europe	&	Central	Asia	 Upper	middle	income	
23	 Madagascar	 Sub-Saharan	Africa	 Low	income	
24	 Mauritius	 Sub-Saharan	Africa	 Upper	middle	income	
25	 Mexico		 Latin	America	&	Caribbean	 Upper	middle	income	
26	 Morocco	 Middle	East	&	North	Africa	 Lower	middle	income	
27	 Mozambique	 Sub-Saharan	Africa	 Low	income	
28	 New	Zealand	 High	income:	OECD	 High	income	
29	 Oman	 Middle	East	&	North	Africa	 High	income	
30	 Paraguay	 Latin	America	&	Caribbean	 Lower	middle	income	
31	 Portugal	 High	income:	OECD	 High	income	
32	 Qatar	 Middle	East	&	North	Africa	 High	income	
33	 Rwanda	 Sub-Saharan	Africa	 Low	income	
34	 Senegal	 Sub-Saharan	Africa	 Low	income	
35	 Singapore	 East	Asia	&	Pacific	 High	income	
36	 Taiwan,	China	 East	Asia	&	Pacific	 High	income	
37	 Togo	 Sub-Saharan	Africa	 Low	income	
38	 Trinidad	and	Tobago	 Latin	America	&	Caribbean	 High	income	
39	 Tunisia	 Middle	East	&	North	Africa	 Lower	middle	income	
40	 Turkey	 Europe	&	Central	Asia	 Upper	middle	income	







	 Country	 Region	 Income	level	
1	 Albania	 Europe	&	Central	Asia	 Upper	middle	income	
2	 Argentina	 Latin	America	&	Caribbean	 Upper	middle	income	
3	 Armenia	 Europe	&	Central	Asia	 Lower	middle	income	
4	 Bahamas,	The	 Latin	America	&	Caribbean	 High	income	
5	 Barbados	 Latin	America	&	Caribbean	 High	income	
6	 Belgium	 High	income:	OECD	 High	income	
7	 Bolivia	 Latin	America	&	Caribbean	 Lower	middle	income	
8	 Brunei	Darussalam	 East	Asia	&	Pacific	 High	income	
9	 Burkina	Faso	 Sub-Saharan	Africa	 Low	income	
10	 Burundi	 Sub-Saharan	Africa	 Low	income	
11	 Cambodia	 East	Asia	&	Pacific	 Lower	middle	income	
12	 Canada	 High	income:	OECD	 High	income	
13	 Chile	 High	income:	OECD	 High	income	
14	 China		 East	Asia	&	Pacific	 Upper	middle	income	
15	 Congo,	Dem.	Rep.	 Sub-Saharan	Africa	 Low	income	
16	 Congo,	Rep.	 Sub-Saharan	Africa	 Lower	middle	income	
17	 Czech	Republic	 High	income:	OECD	 High	income	
18	 Denmark	 High	income:	OECD	 High	income	
19	 Dominican	Republic	 Latin	America	&	Caribbean	 Upper	middle	income	
20	 El	Salvador	 Latin	America	&	Caribbean	 Lower	middle	income	
21	 Estonia	 High	income:	OECD	 High	income	
22	 Fiji	 East	Asia	&	Pacific	 Upper	middle	income	
23	 Georgia	 Europe	&	Central	Asia	 Lower	middle	income	
24	 Greece	 High	income:	OECD	 High	income	
25	 Guatemala	 Latin	America	&	Caribbean	 Lower	middle	income	
26	 Guinea	 Sub-Saharan	Africa	 Low	income	
27	 Guyana	 Latin	America	&	Caribbean	 Upper	middle	income	
28	 Honduras	 Latin	America	&	Caribbean	 Lower	middle	income	
29	 Hong	Kong	SAR,	China	 East	Asia	&	Pacific	 High	income	
30	 Iceland	 High	income:	OECD	 High	income	
31	 India		 South	Asia	 Lower	middle	income	
32	 Jamaica	 Latin	America	&	Caribbean	 Upper	middle	income	
33	 Jordan	 Middle	East	&	North	Africa	 Lower	middle	income	
34	 Kazakhstan	 Europe	&	Central	Asia	 Upper	middle	income	
35	 Kyrgyz	Republic	 Europe	&	Central	Asia	 Low	income	
36	 Lao	PDR	 East	Asia	&	Pacific	 Lower	middle	income	
37	 Lithuania	 Europe	&	Central	Asia	 High	income	
38	 Luxembourg	 High	income:	OECD	 High	income	
39	 Malaysia	 East	Asia	&	Pacific	 Upper	middle	income	
40	 Mali	 Sub-Saharan	Africa	 Low	income	
41	 Malta	 Middle	East	&	North	Africa	 High	income	
42	 Mauritania	 Sub-Saharan	Africa	 Lower	middle	income	
43	 Mongolia	 East	Asia	&	Pacific	 Lower	middle	income	
44	 Myanmar	 East	Asia	&	Pacific	 Low	income	
45	 Namibia	 Sub-Saharan	Africa	 Upper	middle	income	
46	 Nepal	 South	Asia	 Low	income	
47	 Netherlands	 High	income:	OECD	 High	income	
48	 Nicaragua	 Latin	America	&	Caribbean	 Lower	middle	income	
49	 Nigeria		 Sub-Saharan	Africa	 Lower	middle	income	
50	 Pakistan	 South	Asia	 Lower	middle	income	
51	 Panama	 Latin	America	&	Caribbean	 Upper	middle	income	
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52	 Peru	 Latin	America	&	Caribbean	 Upper	middle	income	
53	 Philippines	 East	Asia	&	Pacific	 Lower	middle	income	
54	 Poland	 High	income:	OECD	 High	income	
55	 Puerto	Rico	(U.S.)	 Latin	America	&	Caribbean	 High	income	
56	 Romania	 Europe	&	Central	Asia	 Upper	middle	income	
57	 Russian	Federation		 Europe	&	Central	Asia	 Upper	middle	income	
58	 São	Tomé	and	Príncipe	 Sub-Saharan	Africa	 Lower	middle	income	
59	 Saudi	Arabia	 Middle	East	&	North	Africa	 High	income	
60	 Slovak	Republic	 High	income:	OECD	 High	income	
61	 Slovenia	 High	income:	OECD	 High	income	
62	 Spain	 High	income:	OECD	 High	income	
63	 St.	Kitts	and	Nevis	 Latin	America	&	Caribbean	 High	income	
64	 Sweden	 High	income:	OECD	 High	income	
65	 Switzerland	 High	income:	OECD	 High	income	
66	 Tajikistan	 Europe	&	Central	Asia	 Low	income	
67	 Tanzania	 Sub-Saharan	Africa	 Low	income	
68	 Thailand	 East	Asia	&	Pacific	 Upper	middle	income	
69	 Uganda	 Sub-Saharan	Africa	 Low	income	
70	 Ukraine	 Europe	&	Central	Asia	 Lower	middle	income	
71	 United	Kingdom	 High	income:	OECD	 High	income	
72	 United	States		 High	income:	OECD	 High	income	
73	 Uruguay	 Latin	America	&	Caribbean	 High	income	
74	 Uzbekistan	 Europe	&	Central	Asia	 Lower	middle	income	
75	 Vietnam	 East	Asia	&	Pacific	 Lower	middle	income	
















































































Table A.4. List of Countries 
Afghanistan Czech Rep. Kuwait Rwanda 
Albania Cote d'Ivoire Kyrgyzstan Samoa 
Algeria People's Rep. of Korea Lao People's Dem. Rep. Sao Tome and Principe 
Angola Denmark Latvia Saudi Arabia 
Antigua and Barbuda Djibouti Lebanon Senegal 
Argentina Dominica Lesotho Seychelles 
Armenia Dominican Rep. Liberia Sierra Leone 
Australia Ecuador Libya Singapore 
Austria Egypt Lithuania Slovakia 
Azerbaijan El Salvador Luxembourg Slovenia 
Bahamas Equatorial Guinea Madagascar Solomon Isds 
Bahrain Eritrea Malawi Somalia 
Bangladesh Estonia Malaysia South Africa 
Barbados Ethiopia Maldives Spain 
Belarus Fiji Mali Sri Lanka 
Belize Finland Malta Sudan 
Benin France Mauritania Suriname 
Bermuda Gabon Mauritius Swaziland 
Bhutan Gambia Mexico Sweden 
Bolivia Georgia Mongolia Switzerland 
Bosnia Herzegovina Germany Morocco Syria 
Botswana Ghana Mozambique TFYR of Macedonia 
Brazil Greece Myanmar Tajikistan 
Brunei Darussalam Greenland Namibia Thailand 
Bulgaria Guatemala Nepal Togo 
Burkina Faso Guinea Netherlands Tonga 
Burundi Guinea-Bissau New Zealand Trinidad and Tobago 
Cambodia Guyana Nicaragua Tunisia 
Cameroon Haiti Niger Turkey 
Canada Honduras Nigeria Turkmenistan 
Cape Verde Hungary Norway Tuvalu 
Central African Rep. Iceland Oman USA 
Chad Indonesia Pakistan Uganda 
Chile Iran Palau Ukraine 
China Iraq Panama United Arab Emirates 
China, Hong Kong SAR Ireland Papua New Guinea United Kingdom 
China, Macao SAR Israel Paraguay Uruguay 
Colombia Italy Peru Uzbekistan 
Comoros Jamaica Philippines Vanuatu 
Congo Japan Poland Venezuela 
Costa Rica Jordan Portugal Viet Nam 
Croatia Kazakhstan Qatar Yemen 
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Cuba Kenya Rep. of Korea Zambia 
Cyprus Kiribati Rep. of Moldova Zimbabwe 
 
Table A.5. PPML estimations 
		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	
Dep.	Var:		 X_TFE	 X_TCFE	 X_BTFE	 X_BCTFE	
IND.	Var:	 		 		 		 		








	rta	 0.333***	 0.242***	 -0.061*	 0.006	
	
(0.021)	 (0.047)	 (0.035)	 (0.047)	
comcur	 0.100***	 0.161**	 0.073**	 -0.033	
	
(0.027)	 (0.082)	 (0.034)	 (0.031)	
wto	 0.126***	 0.328***	 0.367***	 -0.011	
	



































Number	of	id	 		 		 27,242	 		
Note:	Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses.	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1.	A	description	of	the	variables	is	given	in	Table	A.3. 
	
